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Panel Four-Post-Trial Review
Although error prevention is the highest priority of the Massachusetts Governor's
Council Report, the Report also seeks to improve the post-trial error detection and
error correction processes. This goal is the subject of recommendations nine and ten.
Participants: Michael J, Jenuwine (moderator), Stephen R. Creason, Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Sam Kamin, William J. Meade, H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Thomas F.
Schornhorst

SUBSTANTIVE APPELLATE REVIEW IN CAPITAL CASES

Joseph L. Hoffmann
I would like to focus my remarks on one of the two recommendations we are
discussing today. I will not talk at length about recommendation number ten, which
proposes the creation of a Death Penalty Review Commission, although I do believe
that this is an important part of the overall plan to eliminate mistakes in the
administration of the death penalty. Many prominent experts in the area of innocence
and the death penalty, including the two co-founders of The Innocence Project, Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld, have strongly advocated such an idea. Connecticut and
North Carolina have recently created Innocence Commissions and more states are sure
to follow. So I certainly hope that recommendation number ten will be seen generally
as a good and not highly controversial idea.
What I would like to talk about briefly is recommendation number nine, which

proposes that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (and the trial court as well, but
I'll be talking mostly about the appellate court) should possess and should exercise
broad, substantive review power over death sentences, so that the Court should reverse
any death sentences on the merits and without regard to procedural defaults or barriers
if it substantively disagrees with the jury's imposition of death.
This recommendation originated in some of the work that I did in Illinois in 2002
and 2003. At that time the Illinois Senate Judiciary Committee was studying the Illinois
Governor's Commission Report and the eighty-five proposed reforms therein. One of
those proposed reforms was that the Illinois Supreme Court should be required to
engage in comparative proportionality review of every death case. For those who are
unfamiliar with the term, comparative proportionality review means that the appellate
court must compare the capital case before it with a universe of factually similar deatheligible cases. If the result reached in the instant case is disproportionate, based on the
comparison with the results reached in the universe of similar cases, then the court
must set aside the death sentence.
In August 2002, 1 testified before a panel ofthe Illinois Senate Judiciary Committee
and expressed my view that comparative proportionality review was a fundamentally
flawed concept. As I put it to the panel members: In the end what is the goal? What is
the ultimate goal of comparative proportionality review? What do you hope to achieve
at the end of the day? It seems to me that the goal must be to produce a legal taxonomy
of death. In other words, to identify, through the inductive process of these explicit
comparisons between cases, those possible combinations of factors that should lead to
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a death sentence as well as those that should lead to a non-death sentence, i.e., to a life
sentence.
But, as we heard yesterday, Justice Harlan wrote back in 1971 that this is a task
beyond present human ability. And I believe that even today we cannot produce a
formula that will tell us when the death penalty should be imposed and when it should
not. We cannot do this today anymore than people could do it at the time that Justice
Harlan wrote those words. Thus, I argued to the Senate Judiciary Committee Panel, it
would be better to focus the appellate courts-to truly focus their attention-on the
substantive merits of each individual death sentence, rather than engage in a process of
explicit case comparisons that could lead only to a jurisprudential dead end.
I, therefore, ended up proposing an alternative idea: That the Illinois Supreme Court
be required in every death penalty case to review the fundamental justice of the death
sentence, on the merits and without regard to any procedural defaults or barriers, and
also without regard to whether that unjust sentence resulted from any procedural error
at the trial. This came to be known as the Fundamental Justice Amendment, or FJA,
and after some political twists and turns, in November 2003 the FJA was
overwhelmingly approved as a key part of the bipartisan death penalty reform bill in
Illinois. It became the law in Illinois in January 2004.
Although it is far too early to be able to observe any effects in practice, the FJA
provides the Illinois Supreme Court with a new and powerful way to ensure substantive
accuracy and fairness in capital cases. And it has been so described by numerous
observers-including the Chicago Tribune, which originally opposed the FJA-as one
of the most important and potentially beneficial features of the 2003 reform legislation.
Now, in Massachusetts it was not necessary to propose something like the FJA,
because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court already possessed similar authority
under existing state law. All that was necessary was for the Governor's Council to
highlight that existing authority, and to encourage strongly the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court to feel free to exercise it. And that is what we did in recommendation
number ten.
In my opinion, the idea of substantive appellate review is an idea whose time has
come. In most other countries around the world substantive appellate review is viewed
as an essential component of a fair criminal justice system. Our focus in modem
America on procedural justice has all too often left us unwilling or unable to recognize
the simple reality that even perfect trial procedures do not guarantee perfect outcomes.
Sometimes juries do make mistakes, even in a procedurally fair trial. We should
empower our appellate courts, not just in capital cases (although the momentum starts
there), to protect defendants from such substantive mistakes. This does not interfere
with the basic purpose of the defendant's right to a jury trial. It merely supplements it
with an additional safeguard for the defendant's liberty.
Are there potential problems with substantive appellate review? Yes. Two come
immediately to mind. First, appellate judges may not choose to exercise this power,
especially if they fear the political consequences of reversing a death sentence. Second,
juries eventually may become aware of this power, and this knowledge may diminish
the jury's proper sense of moral responsibility for the capital sentencing decision that it
must make at trial. These problems need to be addressed as the FJA and similar
proposals gradually take effect. Nevertheless, in the end I believe that substantive
appellate review will someday be seen as one of the significant advances in twenty-first
century American criminal jurisprudence. Yes, it will require a role reorientation by
appellate judges who have become accustomed to examining criminal cases through a
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procedural lens only, But this shift in roles, I believe, can only work to the overall
betterment of the criminal justice system. Thank you and I look forward to your
comments.

THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL APPEALS IN MASSACHUSETTS
William J. Meade
As you might guess, I'm not going to be critical of the Council's Report. And
without any planning or prior discussion with Professor Hoffmann, my remarks
actually, I hope, should dovetail with what Professor Hoffmann just said. In
recommendation number nine, the Council encouraged the use of this substantive
appellate review power that you referred to. It's actually a statutory power in
Massachusetts. It's in Chapter 278, Section 33E of our General Laws. And I just want
to briefly explain what it is and where it comes from.
On a spring day in 1920, in a town just south of Boston-actually, not too far from
where I was born-two payroll guards were walking through a street, in the town of
Braintree, and they were robbed and killed by gunmen. Three weeks later Nicola Sacco
and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were arrested. They were later indicted for first-degree
murder and robbery. After a six-week, hard-fought trial they were convicted in July of
1921. Six years and several appeals later they were executed. After those executions in
1927 Massachusetts convened a judicial council to look into the problems that
occurred in the Sacco and Vanzetti case. The main concern of the Council was not the
fairness of the trial that Sacco and Vanzetti had, or even the political atmosphere under
which they were tried. The main focus of the Council was that it took six years to
execute them.
As a result of the Council's Report, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Section
33E. But that took twelve more years and several more councils before it became law.
Prior to this 1939 enactment of 33E, our State Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ("SJC"), was empowered to pass only on issues of law. And
the power to order a new trial in a capital case was vested solely in a trial judge. On a
review, an appellate court could only review abuses of discretion in that area. In Sacco
and Vanzetti's case, the appeal process, as I said, took many years and invoked
multiple defense motions for new trials. And the SJC's review was again, strictly
confined to issues of law and whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a
motion for new trial.
What 33E did was it changed that. And, for the first time in Massachusetts, capital
cases were transferred in whole to the appellate court for review of matters of fact and
law. 33E also gave the SJC, for the first time, the power to grant a new trial in a capital
case. Now, as you know, we're not a new state. In fact, our SJC is the longest
continuing existing court in the Western Hemisphere. However, it wasn't until 1939
that the SJC had this ability to order a new trial in a capital case.
Section 33E also (and this is a subtle component ofproportionality the way the SJC
views it; I don't know if they've ever expressed it in this fashion) empowers the SJC to
grant, to enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt. In 1939, we had a death penalty, so
the SJC was empowered to lower the verdict to a non-capital crime or non-capital
murder, or even lower it to second-degree murder, and even to manslaughter, if its

